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Public Opinion and the 1996 Elections in Russia:
Nostalgic and Statist, Yet Pro-Market and Pro-Yeltsin
David S. Mason and Svetlana Sidorenko-Stephenson

Introduction
Between 1991 and 1996 Russia underwent a precipitous economic
and social decline with decreases in production, gross national product, and wages, and increases in inequality, crime, and corruption_
Most people experienced a decline in their standard of living, and
many fondly recalled the security and stability of the communist era_
Nevertheless, in the two main cases when the Russian electorate was
confronted with a choice of directions in economic policy-the referendum of 1993 and the presidential elections of 1996-the majority
chose reform_ Writing about Boris Yeltsin's surprising victory in the
1996 presidential elections, a Pravda commentator mused: "Logically,
he should have lost, since he was unable to fully solve any of the
problems that have piled up: the stagnation of production, the impoverishment of a majority of the people, growing unemployment, the
chronic nonpayment of wages, the decline in science, culture and education, the continuing conflict in Chechnya, etc. Nevertheless, Yeltsin
received a majority of the electorate's votes_"} We will explore this
apparent paradox using public opinion data from two large-scale surveys of popular perceptions concerning social, economic, and political
justice that were conducted in Russia in 1991 and 1996 as part of the
International Social Justice Project. 2 In this project, nationally repre-

The authors would like to thank Matthew Wyman, James Kluegel, John Clark and the
anonymous referees for the Slavic Review for their comments and suggestions for this
paper, and Katherine Hardin Currie for her research assistance_ This article stems
from the collaborative work of the International Social Justice Project (see note 2),
which was supported by funding from the National Council for Soviet and East European Research (now the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research)
and by the Open Society Institute. Svetlana Sidorenko-Stephenson's research for this
article was supported by a fellowship from the Leverhulme Trust.
1. Boris Slavin in Pravda, 9 July 1996, 1-2; translated in Current Digest of the PostSoviet Press 48, no. 27 (31 July 1996): 8-9.
2. The International Social Justice Project is an international collaborative project
that conducted a common survey on attitudes concerning justice using nationally
representative samples in thirteen countries in east and west in 1991, and then replicated that survey in 1996 in Russia, Estonia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Germany, and the
Czech Republic. An analysis of the 1991 survey can be found in James R. Kluegel,
David S. Mason, and Bernd Wegener, eds., Social Justice and Political Change: Public
opinion in Capitalist and Post-Communist States (New York, 1995). Principal investigators
in the 1996 replication project are Ludmila Khakhulina and Svetlana SidorenkoStephenson (Russia); Andrus Saar (Estonia); Antal Orkeny (Hungary); Alexander
Stoyanov (Bulgaria); Bernd Wegener (Germany); Petr Mateju (Czech Republic); and
David Mason and James Kluegel (United States). Funding for the project was provided
Slavic Review 56, no. 4 (Winter 1997)
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sentative samples of more than 1,500 respondents were interviewed in
each of these two years to ascertain their attitudes and beliefs about
social, political, and economic justice. The 1996 survey was conducted
in the first two weeks of June, just before the first round of the presi·
dential elections. It was an almost identical replication of the 1991
one: 80 percent of the questions were from the earlier survey; the
remaining 20 percent were new questions.
We will look at a small number of questions from that survey,
comparing responses from 1996 to those of 1991 and paying particular
attention to the respondents' sense of their own social and economic
status, their retrospective assessments of the past, their attitudes toward
the fairness of the new economic and social system, in comparison to
the old system. We will also discuss the implications of these attitudes
for political behavior, and especially for their support of Yeltsin, of
Communist Party candidate Gennadii Ziuganov, and of other presi·
dential candidates in the elections in the summer of 1996.
The presidential elections were held in two rounds on 17 June and
3 July 1996. At the beginning of that year, polls showed Yeltsin winning
only about 8 percent of the vote, with Ziuganov, Grigorii Iavlinskii,
Aleksandr Lebed', and Vladimir Zhirinovskii all receiving more support. 3 Over the course of the spring and summer, though, Yeltsin's
standing improved dramatically and in the first round of voting in
June, he won 35 percent of the vote, compared to Ziuganov's 32 percent. In the July runoff, Yeltsin won almost 54 percent of the vote,
compared to Ziuganov's 40 percent. In the face of serious economic
decline and widespread political apathy and antipathy, this was a stunning victory for Yeltsin.
Many analysts attributed Yeltsin's victory to his effective use of the
media, his announcement about the Chechen peace talks, or his promises of government handouts to various groups and regions. 4 Although
by the National Council for Soviet and East European Research and by the Open
Society Institute. Further information on the International Social Justice Project can
be found at the project's website: www.Butler.edu/ISJP.
The Russian surveys were conducted by the All-Russian Center for Public Opinion
Research (VTsIOM), and the principal investigators were Ludmila Khakhulina and
Svetlana Sidorenko-Stephenson. The 1996 survey was conducted from 3 to 15 June
1996 in face-to-face interviews of 1,585 respondents selected by a three-stage regionalized stratified route sample of Russia's population 18 years and older. The 1991
survey, conducted from 20 October to 25 November 1991, employed a similar sample
and had 1,734 respondents.
3. President Boris Yeltsin was considered a centrist reformer; Gennadii Ziuganov
was the leader of the Russian Communist Party and the candidate of a coalition of
leftist parties; Grigorii Iavlinskii was a pro-market economist; the ultranationalist Via·
dimir Zhirinovskii and his party, the Liberal Democratic Party, had done well in the
1993 elections; and retired General Aleksandr Lebed' was a nationalist and a hero of
the Afghan war.
4. See, for example, Boris Kagarlitsky, "Russia Chooses-and Loses," Current History 95, no. 603 (October 1996): 305-10; Erik Depoy, "Boris Yeltsin and the 1996
Russian Presidential Election," Presidential Studies Quarterly 26, no. 4 (Fall 1996):
1140-63; and Daniel Treisman, "Why Yeltsin Won," Foreign Affairs 75, no. 5 (September-October 1996): 64-77.
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these may have played a role, it is apparent from the opinion data that
the support for Yeltsin was more deep-seated than that, being rooted
in economic interests and a belief in the inevitability of the market by
a significant part of the electorate. And to the extent that Yeltsin
"bought" the elections with government largess, this was not simply a
slick maneuver, but a response to solid support for a continuing strong
governmental role in the economy and society.

Real and Perceived Decline
The government's electoral victory was remarkable in the face of
the dramatic economic and social declines during the Yeltsin years. In
both western democratic states and the postcommunist states of eastern Europe, sitting governments are often punished for poor economic
performance. Eastern Europe, in particular, had seen electoral "left
turns" in Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria, and in the Russian
parliamentary elections of December 1995, the Communist Party garnered twice as many votes (22 percent of the total) as any other.
Russia's long economic slide after 1989 seemed destined to playa
role in the 1996 elections as well. Russia's gross domestic product
dropped by almost half from 1989 to 1994, while annual inflation
averaged 230 percent. 5 Real wages declined by half from 1991 to 1996.
Unemployment rose steadily, reaching 8.4 percent of the workforce
(using International Labor Organization methodology) in early 1996. 6
Almost a quarter of the population was living below the poverty line,
while the number of wealthy continued growing, sharply increasing
the rich-poor gap.7
In these circumstances, it is not surprising that most Russians were
gloomy about the state of the country, the economy, and their own
economic situations. When asked about their household incomes in
our June 1996 survey, almost two-thirds responded that they had "much
less" than they needed. 8 When asked how satisfied they were with their
standard of living, on a seven-point scale, 26 percent said they were
"completely dissatisfied," compared to 21 percent in that category in
the 1991 survey. With respect to their overall financial situation, 55
percent thought they were worse off than in 1991. When asked in 1996
to place themselves on a ten-point scale of "social standing" for both
5. Transition: The Newsletter about Reforming Economies (World Bank), September-October 1995 and April 1997.
6. OMRI Daily Report, 19 February 1996 (distributed bye-mail).
7. The income ratio between the richest 10 percent of the population and the
poorest 10 percent jumped from 4.5 in 1992 to 13.4 in 1995. See N. K. Chandra,
"Dimensions of Social and Economic Crisis in Russia Today," Economic and Political
Weekly, 11 May 1996, 1145.
8. In a January 1996 survey conducted in Russia by Richard Rose, over half of
the population said that they had sometimes or often had to do without both food
and clothing over the past twelve months. "The Views of Rank and File Russians,"
American Enterprise 7, no. 4 (July-August 1996): 57.
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1991 and 1996, about half placed themselves lower on the scale for
1996 than for 1991.
Our 1996 survey asked a number of "retrospective" questions, that
is, inquiring how respondents remembered things in 1991. This en·
abled us to compare the remembered responses of the 1996 sample
with the actual ones given by 1991 respondents. There is a clear pattern, as one might expect, of the 1996 respondents remembering 1991
much more fondly than their 1991 counterparts experienced it at the
time. We mentioned above the perceptions of social standing on the
ten-point scale, with 1 being low and 10 high. In the 1991 survey, the
average score on this scale was 4.02. In the 1996 survey, the average
score was 4.08-essentially the same as 1991. But when we asked respondents in the 1996 survey where they were on the scale in 1991,
that average was 5.06, considerably higher than both their current
standing and the real average reported in 1991. So even though there
were no big changes in social standing over that five-year period, most
people (50 percent)Jelt that they had lost ground, while only 18 percent
felt they had gained. 9
A similar tendency was at work in the way Russians reported satisfaction with various spheres of their lives. In both 1991 and 1996 we
asked them to indicate how satisfied or dissatisfied they were with
different things in their lives, using a seven-point scale from completely
dissatisfied to completely satisfied. Among others, we asked about the
political system and about the respondent'sjob, standard ofliving, and
life as a whole. In 1996 we also asked people about their satisfaction
"thinking back to early 1991." We also added a question on the current
market economy (for 1996) and on the planned economy (for 1991).
As is evident from table 1, satisfaction levels in 1996 were not all that
different from those expressed in 1991, with a slight increase for the
political system and slight decreases for satisfaction with jobs, standard
of living, and overall life. But in 1996, people remembered being much
more satisfied in 1991 than they were currently. There is, thus, a kind
of halo effect around the "old days," even for the political system.
Of course, yearning for the "good old days" is not unique to the
postcommunist states. Studies in the United States, for example, have
found that most people perceive the world as having been better in
the past]O and that nostalgia always occurs "in the context of present
fears, discontents, anxieties or uncertainties."]] As one might expect,
older people are particularly likely to be nostalgic. In a stable, insti9. This same phenomenon was true in Bulgaria, Estonia, and Hungary, other
countries involved in the International Social Justice Project replication. See David
Mason, Antal Orkeny, and Svetlana Sidorenko-Stephenson, "Increasingly Fond Memories of a Grim Past," Transition: Events and Issues in the Former Soviet Union and East·
Central and Southeastern Europe (OMRI) 3, no. 5 (21 March 1997): 15-19.
10. See, for example, Krystine Irene Batcho, "Nostalgia: A Psychological Perspective," Perceptual and Motor Skills 80 (1995): 131-43; and American Demographics 18, no. 4
(April 1996): 35.
11. Fred Davis, Yearning for Yesterday: A Sociology of Nostalgia (N ew York, 1979), 34.
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Table 1
Satisfaction with Various Spheres of Life, Current and
Retrospective, 1991 and 1996
(Mean values on seven-point scale;
1 = completely dissatisfied; 7 = completely satisfied)
Spheres

1991

1996 Retrospect of 1991

1996

Political system
Job
Standard of living
Current economy
Life as whole

2.41
4.46
3.01
not asked
3.70

4.22
5.21
4.81
4.23
4.88

3.00
4.29
2.92
2.76
3.37

tutionalized system like the United States, though, nostalgia per se is
not likely to have a significant political impact. In Russia, where the
economic and political systems are still fluid, and where nostalgia is
focused on a rejected ideological system, it can become a highly charged
political issue.
The increasing pessimism and negativism about the economy and
living standards mimicked, and perhaps caused, a further decline in
trust in the government and political institutions in Russia. Though
the old communist political system was dismantled and largely reo
placed with democratic institutions and processes between 1991 and
1996, there was a sharp drop-off in the number of Russians agreeing
that the government could be trusted "to do what is right" and that
the government is "run for the benefit of all the people" (see table 2).
The 1991 figures for trust in government in Russia were not too dif-

Table 2
Trust in Government among Russians, 1991 and 1996
(in percentages)
How often does
government do what is
right?

Very often
Often
Sometimes
Rarely
Never
N

How often is
government run for
benefit of all?

1991

1996

1991

1996

3.6
22.1
37.4
23.6
13.4

1.4
8.5
38.9
39.1
12.1

1.6
21.2
36.4
31.5
9.3

0.9
4.7
32.9
44.2
17.3

1458

1364

1452

1395

Questionnaire items: How much of the time do you think you can trust the federal
government in Russia to do what is right? How much of the time do you think the
federal government in Russia is run for the benefit of all the people? (Don't knows
are excluded from the figures in the table.)
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Table 3
Winners and Losers in the Transition
(in percentages)
Definitely won
Rather won than lost
Neither won nor lost
Rather lost than won
Definitely lost
Don't know

3.3
10.4

28.7
24.1
23.2
10.4

Questionnaire item: Do you think that you personally
have won or lost from the ongoing social transfor·
mation?

ferent from those in the western countries in our 1991 survey, including Britain,japan, and West Germany_ (The United States, despite the
notion that it is a country of people cynical about their government,
had the most positive scores on these two questions of any of the
thirteen countries in the sample_) But by 1996, the Russians were more
negative about government than any of the thirteen countries in our
1991 sample, east or west; and more negative than all the other postcommunist states in our 1996 sample (except Bulgaria, which was in
the midst of its own economic and political crisis at the time).
These results complement those of other studies, including Richard
Rose's periodic surveys in Russia where people are asked to compare
the present economic and political systems with the communist era
ones. In early 1996, Russians were still much more positive than negative (59 percent to 22 percent) about "Russia's pre-perestroika political
system" and even more positive about the previous economic system
(72 percent positive to 14 percent negative)_ As one would expect, older
people were more positive about the old system than were younger
people, but even among the youngest group (from 18 to 29 years old),
a majority gave positive ratings to both the economic and the political
systems of the pre-perestroika era_ 12 As will be discussed, this reflects
the substantial personal economic problems that most Russians faced
during the transition process.
Overall, very few people experienced the transitional period in a
positive way in personal terms. When we asked respondents if they
had "personally won or lost from the ongoing social transformation,"
only about 15 percent felt that they were "winners," while almost half
thought that they had lost (see table 3). As we will see, this overall sense
of one's experience during the transition has a great deal of influence
on one's perception of both the past and the present economic and
political systems, and on one's voting behavior in the 1996 elections.
But it will also become clear that many people voted for Yeltsin in spite
of their own negative economic experiences of the past.
12. "The Views of Rank and File Russians," 57.
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Table 4
Support for a Strong Role for the Government
(percentage of respondents agreeing "strongly" or "somewhat")

The government should provide a job for everyone who wants
one.
The government should guarantee everyone a minimum
standard of living.
The government should place an upper limit on the amount of
money anyone person can make.

Russia

U.K.
1991

1991

1996

66.9

95.9

94.6

82.9

88.0

93.1

38.6

34.2

42.6

Raise the Floor and the Ceiling
Russians' experience with the transition from plan to market has
given them a curious combination of attitudes: they basically accept
the idea of the transition to the market, welcome the opportunities
that the market provides, and tolerate the wealth and inequality that
it generates; but they also hold on to their statist and egalitarian views
that call for the government to protect the poor and provide a social
safety net. The contrast between these "ceiling" and "floor" issues are
revealed in a battery of questions we asked in both 1991 and 1996
about the role of the government: whether the government should
provide everyone with a minimum standard of living; provide a job
for everyone who wants one; and place an upper limit on the amount
of money anyone person can make. For purposes of comparison, we
have included the figures for the United Kingdom from the 1991 survey.
As is evident from table 4, Russians were almost unanimous in
supporting government economic "floors" in both 1991 and 1996_ 13 It
was clear from our 1991 survey, however, that this was not just a statism
bred of experience under communism, since most people in the capitalist states also supported these principles. 14 On the issue of stateprovided jobs, however, the Russians were far more supportive than
13. High levels of support for a strong governmental role in social welfare have
been found in many other surveys as well, including James L. Gibson, "Political and
Economic Markets," Journal of Politics 58, no. 4 (November 1996): 954-84; and Arthur
H. Miller, William M. Reisinger, and Vicki L. Hesli, "Understanding Political Change
in Post-Soviet Societies: A Further Commentary on Finifter and Mickiewicz, American
Political Science Review 90, no. 1 (March 1996): 153-66. Another study found "a massive
shift away from individualism" (toward statism) in Russia between 1989 and 1995.
Robert J. Brym, "Reevaluating Mass Support for Political and Economic Change in
Russia," Europe-Asia Studies 48, no. 5 (1996): 751-66.
14. See, for example, James R. Kluegel and Masaru Miyano, 'Justice Beliefs and
Support for the Welfare State in Advanced Capitalism," in Kluegel, Mason, and
Wegener, eds., Social Justice and Political Change, 81-108.
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any other country in the sample in 1991, and remained so in 1996.
The increased support for a minimum standard of living and the con·
tinued high support for state·providedjobs was due in part, no doubt,
to the continuing escalation of unemployment, unpaid wages, and pov·
erty that was plaguing Russia at the time. 15
On the issue of ceilings, however, Russians were much less egali·
tarian, in both 1991 and 1996, and their opinions were not much
different from those in democratic capitalist states such as Britain. On
other questions in our survey, too, one sees a reluctance on the part
of Russians to limit the accumulation of wealth. Four·fifths or more of
the sample agreed that "people are entitled to keep what they have
earned, even if this means some people will be wealthier than others"
(84.2 percent); that people who work hard deserve to earn more than
those who do not (93.1 percent); and that people are entitled to pass
on their wealth to their children (95.8 percent). All of these figures are
slightly lower than they were in the 1991 survey-probably a reaction
to the widespread tales of corruption and ostentatious wealth-but still
they remained remarkably high.
Do Russians prefer flexible ceilings on wealth and incomes in their
own self.interest, or for the good of the economy and the society? It
could be, for example, that the support for high floors and ceilings
are both bred of self.interest-wanting the assurance of government
support in case of need, but also wanting to leave open the possibility
and the opportunity for the personal accumulation of wealth. But these
sentiments could also be based on some notion of what is good for the
society as a whole-that minimums will protect the poor, and high
ceilings will create incentives that will drive economic growth. The
"good of society" issue is tapped by a proposition we posed in both
1991 and 1996: "It is all right if businessmen make good profits because
everyone benefits in the end." In 1991, 72 percent of our respondents
agreed with this statement; in 1996 only 41 percent did (the same
percentage disagreed).
On this question, as with many others, it seems that the early en·
thusiasm for capitalism, and especially for profits, had.diminished
somewhat five years into the transition. It would be too much to say,
however, that Russians were opposed to business profits; rather their
orientation was more ambivalent. One could argue, in fact, that the
1996 responses were more sensible and realistic than the overwhelm·
ing support for business profits in 1991-support much higher than
that of any of the capitalist countries in our sample in that year. But
Russians did appear to favor the high ceilings primarily for the op'
15. A 1995 survey of elites and masses in Russia found much higher levels of
support for state welfare polides among the masses than among the elites. Arthur H.
Miller, Regan Checchio, William M. Reisinger, and Vicki L. Hesli, "Comparing Mass
and Elite Conceptions of Social Justice in Post·Soviet Societies," paper presented at
the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Stud·
ies, Boston, November 1996.
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Table 5
Support for Floors and Ceilings
by Winners and Losers in the Transition
(percentage of respondents agreeing "strongly" or "somewhat")

Definitely won
Rather won
Neither
Rather lost
Definitely lost

Government
standard of
living

Government
provide jobs

Government
limit
earnings

Business
profits
ok

Keep what
you earn

75.0
89.2
93.8
94.3
97.6

83.3
90.8
95.4
96.8
97.9

22.3
23.5
37.6
47.9
56.7

67.3
70.8
47.5
35.7
24.6

92.7
92.0
87.8
84.6
76.9

Questionnaire items: The government should guarantee everyone a minimum stan·
dard of living; the government should provide a job for everyone who wants one; the
government should place an upper limit on the amount of money anyone person
can make; it is all right if businessmen make good profits because everyone benefits
in the end; people are entitled to keep what they have earned even if this means some
people will be wealthier than others.

portunities they provided for themselves and ordinary people rather
than for the potential benefit they might provide to the economy as a
whole.
One sees support for this proposition in table 5, which shows the
level of support for high floors and ceilings broken down by winners
and losers. As one might expect, the winners are more likely to favor
high ceilings, and less likely to favor floors, than are the losers from
the transition. But there are interesting variations on this theme. First
of all, there are relatively minor differences between winners and los·
ers on the issues of government provision of jobs and a minimal stan·
dard of living. As we saw earlier, these propositions remain virtually
universal in Russia. There are much bigger differences between win·
ners and losers on the issue of ceilings, with winners two to three times
more likely to think business profits benefit all and to oppose govern·
ment limits on wealth. 16 The "keep·earn" question, on whether people
should be able to keep what they earn, is different from the other two
ceilings questions, however. Even the losers overwhelmingly support
this proposition. This suggests again that Russians support the high
ceilings, not so much because they think the economy will benefit, but
because they think they themselves will benefit. While business wealth
16. The chi square statistic shows a statistically significant relationship (at the
.001 level) between the winners/losers question and each of the five attitudinal ques·
tions in table 5, though the chi square is much larger on the two ceilings questions
(130 for "government should place an upper limit on earnings" and 222 for "all right
if businessmen make good profits") than for the two government provisions questions
(97 for "government should guarantee a minimum standard of living" and 91 for
"government should provide jobs"); 16 degrees of freedom for each.
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does not really benefit society, and the government should place limits
on what other people can make, people (that is, me) should be able to
keep what they have earned.
This tendency, to favor limits on the wealth of others, but to be
opposed to restrictions on one's own possibilities, is reflected in a
similar discrepancy in Russians' views of the country's future as opposed to their own futures. When asked whether the percentage of
poor people will increase or decrease over the next five years (asked
in both 1991 and 1996), the overwhelming majority (64 percent in
1996; 89 percent in 1991) thinks that the percentage of poor will increase. But only about 14 percent think that their own financial situation will deteriorate over the next five years. Somewhat more, in fact,
think their own situation will improve. So there does seem to be a
sense of individual opportunity and possibility, even if Russians' sense
of the overall situation and prospects for the country are not very good.

Support for Socialism and Capitalism
This mix of attitudes about wealth, profits, inequality, and the role
of the state leads Russians to support, in a curious way, both socialism
and the marketP As is evident from table 6, about two-thirds of the
samples in both years agreed that "a free market economy is essential
for our economic development" while only about a fifth opposed that
proposition. At the same time, about a third of the population remains
favorably disposed toward socialism and only another third is against
it. Support for the market declined somewhat from 1991 to 1996, and
support for socialism increased somewhat, but still more people support the market than socialism. IS Cross-tabulations of these variables
show that in both 1991 and 1996, about a third of those favorably
inclined to socialism also favored the market and only about a third
of those favoring socialism disagreed with the development of a free
market economy.
17. When asked in another 1994 survey about their favored type of government
and economy, the most frequent response from Russians (39.4 percent of the total)
was "a government with a strong state sector and wide private opportunities for the
citizen." See M. K. Gorshkov, A. Iu. Chepurenko, and F. E. Sheregi, eds., Rossiia v
zerkale reform: Khrestomatiia po sotsiologii sovremennogo TOssiiskogo obshchestva (Moscow,
1995), 26.
18. Rose's 1996 Russia survey, mentioned above, also found more people supporting continuing market reforms (30 percent) than halting them, even though many
more people expressed positive views of the communist-era economic system than of
the current one. Another All-Russian Center for Public Opinion Research survey in
1997 found similar results, with Russians one and a half times more likely to favor
market reforms than oppose them, but by a similar ratio more dissatisfied than satisfied with the development of the market economy thus far. Aleksandr Golov, "Reputatsiya rinochnoi ekonomiki u rossiyan," Economic and Social Change: The Monitoring
of Public Opinion 3 (May-June 1997): 31-33. And an earlier survey found "broad support" for the liberalizing economic reforms of 1991. Lynn D. Nelson, Lilia V. Babaeva,
and Rufat O. Babaev, "Perspectives on Entrepreneurship and Privatization in Russia:
Policy and Public Opinion," Slavic Review 51, no. 2 (Summer 1992): 271-86.

Table 6
Support for Socialism and for the Market, 1991 and 1996
(in percentages)

Strongly agree
Somewhat agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree
Don't know
N

A free market
economy is essential
to our economic
development.

Based on your
experience of
socialism in the
Soviet Union, would
you say you favor or
oppose socialism?

1991

1996

1991

1996

26.6
25.5
6.8
8.4
6.6
26.0
1734

20.5
30.7
10.7
9.1
8.5
20.5
1585

7.7
13.6
23.8
17.1
17.8
20.1
1734

13.0
20.2
24.6
16.7
13.0
12.6
1585

Very much in favor
Somewhat in favor
Neither for nor against
Somewhat against
Totally against
Don't know
N
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We are interested, of course, not just in the changing levels of
popular support for the market and for socialism, but in the socioeconomic and demographic determinants of such support. This is revealed in regression results reported in table 7, which shows some
interesting changes from 1991 to 1996_ 19 In the earlier survey, the most
important determinants of attitudes toward both the market and socialism were education, age, and gender. The highly educated, men,
and younger people were more favorably inclined toward the market
and less favorably disposed toward socialism_ By 1996, the strongest
determinants of such attitudes were not demographic but economic.
The most significant determinants of support for both the market and
socialism were "social standing;" (where one placed oneself on a tenpoint scale) and household income_ Furthermore, when the winnersl
losers question is thrown into the mix, this item becomes by far the
most powerful determinant of support for both the market and socialism_ So by 1996, the differences by age, gender, and education had
largely been eclipsed by economic factors-how well one was doing
economically and socially_20 This testifies to the enormous impact economic change and dislocations have on attitudes toward fundamental
issues in the postcommunist period_ As we will see, this predominance
of economic issues will also have a major impact on the political arena
and on the elections of 1996_
Experiences of Injustice

The ambivalent attitudes toward both "Soviet-style" socialism and
the market are evidenced as well in Russians' personal experiences
both during and after the communist era_ In our 1991 survey, we asked
a series of questions about how often people had "personally experienced injustice" in their lives because of the following factors: your
religious beliefs, your sex, your social background, your age, a lack of
money, the part of the country you are from, your political beliefs, or
your race or ethnic group_ The results from the 1991 survey were
surprising to us, and to many others to whom we reported them: in
all of the postcommunist states, the overwhelming majority responded
"never" to each of these questions (that is, that they had never experienced injustice)_ An index consisting of the sum of positive responses
19. The beta coefficients in this table indicate the relative weight of each independent variable (education, age, etc.) in explaining variance in the dependent variable (support for socialism versus the market) for each year.
20. Other surveys have shown mixed results on this issue of economic versus
ideological determinants of support for reforms. In a 1992 survey in Russia, James
Gibson ("Political and Economic Markets," 981) found that "commitment to market
institutions was not so much ideological as a reflection of perceptions of current and
future economic conditions." On the other hand, Miller, Checchio, Reisinger, and
Hesli ("Comparing Mass and Elite Conceptions," 14) argue, in their 1995 survey, that
support for a market economy and a reduced role for the state depends more on
"popular perceptions of distributive justice" than on "simple economic hardship."

Table 7
Determinants of Support for Free Market and Socialism, 1991 and 1996
(standardized regression coefficient-beta)
Approval of socialism
1 = high 5 = low

Support for the market
1 = high 5 = low
1991
Education
Age
Gender (1 = M 2 = F)
Social standing (1 = low 10
Income (20·tiles; 1 = low)
WinnersJlosers
R2

= high)

-.15***
.13***
.10**
.12***
-.07*
.10

1996

1996+

-.14***
.09**
.02
.18***
-.18***

-.12***
.06
.02
.06*
-.07*
.38***
.26

.16

*p < .05 **p < .01 *** P < .001; R2 significant at .001 level for all values.
Note: 1996+ includes additional independent variables (winners/losers)

1991
.l2***
-.25***
-.11 ***
-.02
.03
.12

1996

1996+

.10***
-.08**
.01
-.18***
.25***

.09***
-.04
.01
-.04
.10***
-.49***
.36

.18
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across all eight of these dimensions found no significant differences
between the postcommunist and the capitalist states. 21
At the time, it seemed unlikely that Russians really had experienced
less injustice than had people in the United States or Britain, for ex·
ample. We discussed several alternative explanations for the results:
that (in that disruptive transitional year of 1991) they confounded or
conflated experienced injustice in the communist period with the early
postcommunist period; that people were perhaps afraid to answer these
questions truthfully; or that people living in a closed society like the
Soviet one simply did not know injustice (for example gender discrimination) when they experienced it.
In our 1996 survey, we asked the same set of questions again, though
this time we asked them to think first about their experience of injus·
tice "before perestroika" (that is, the communist era) and then about
injustice "since the beginning of perestroika" (that is, after communism). The results of the retrospective question were astoundingly similar to those from the 1991 survey: on each of the questions (regarding
sex, race, politics, and so on) over 80 percent of the respondents reported they had "never" personally experienced injustice; and fully 61
percent responded "never" on all of the items. Indeed, there were
many more of these "never" responses than there had been in 1991,
and people were no more likely to have experienced injustice "before
perestroika" than they did afterwards.
There may be many social and psychological factors at work here,
including the tendency reported earlier for Russians to idealize the
past in the very difficult circumstances of the present. But certainly
our alternative explanations from 1991 were no longer valid: the questionnaire clearly differentiated the communist from the postcommunist eras; people should no longer have been afraid to answer such
questions truthfully; and they should have had a somewhat better idea,
at least, of the criteria for injustice. Thus the 1991 and 1996 surveys
in combination seem to confirm that on the individual level, at least,
most Russians did not experience the communist era as terribly unjust.
And as we have seen above, in 1996 they also remembered the objective
conditions of the late communist era (social standing, standard of living, and so on) in a quite favorable way. These may have been "fond
memories of a grim past," but in the difficult circumstances of 1996,
perceptions were actually more important than reality. Perhaps the situation in 1996 was better than in 1991, but if people remembered and
experienced things otherwise, that is what will affect their attitudes
and behavior.
21. See David S. Mason, 'Justice, Socialism and Participation in the Postcom·
munist States," in Kluegel, Mason, and Wegener, eds., Social Justice and Political Change,
54-56; and James R. Kluegel and David S. Mason, "Political Involvement in Transition:
Who Participated and Electoral Dynamics in Central and Eastern Europe," Report of
the National Council for Soviet and East European Research, February 1996.
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Yeltsin, Ziuganov, and Popular Attitudes

Boris Yeltsin seems to have won the 1996 presidential elections by
winning over the majority of Russians who wanted both to preserve
some of the social guarantees of the communist system and to move
ahead into a more market-oriented system-people who wanted to
raise both the floors and the ceilings_ The choice between Yeltsin and
Ziuganov, however, was not so much based on ideology, or even on
this issue offl00rs and ceilings, which most people favored in any case,
but on more practical issues of economics and, in particular, peoples'
own experience with the transition. We saw earlier that these economic
issues, and whether or not people felt they were winners or losers in
the transition, were the main determinants of attitudes toward socialism and toward the market. It turns out that these economic issues,
and generalized support for or opposition to socialism and the market,
were the greatest determinants of one's voting intentions in the 1996
elections as well.
Table 8 shows candidate voting intentions (from our 1996 survey)
by this "winners or losers" scale ("Do you think that you personally
have won or lost from the ongoing social transformation?") for the top
vote getters in the first round of the presidential elections. As the table
shows, Yeltsin was the overwhelming favorite of people who felt they
were winners in the transition period, even though these constituted
only about 20 percent of the sample. His support drops off sharply
after that, but he still captures about half of the people who feel they
are neither winners nor losers. Only among the "losers" does Yeltsin
fail to win a majority. While Ziuganov wins a substantial number of
these voters, the losers vote is divided among several contenders, so
Ziuganov is unable to pick up even half of those who felt they had
"definitely lost" from the transition.
With Yeltsin assured of winning the winners' votes in the election,
he could devote his attentions to assuaging the concerns of the losers,
which he did by promising continued gradual change and increased
Table 8
Presidential Voting Intentions
by Winners and Losers in the Transition
(in percentages)
Have you won
or lost from
the transition?

Iavlinskii

YeItsin

Zhirinovskii

Ziuganov

Lebed'

Totals

Definitely won
Rather won
Neither
Rather lost
Definitely lost

11.1
9.9
12.9
8.5
5.4

75.6
77.2
50.5
23.2
15.8

2.5
4.1
7.0
8.7

2.2
1.9
12.9
37.1
49.4

4.4
4.3
6.9
lO.7
13.3

4.3
15.6
30.6
26.2
23.2

Intend to vote for following as president

Note: Only top candidates are included, so rows do not total lOO percent.
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Table 9
Voting Intentions by Winners/Losers and Market Orientation

Pro-market winners
Anti-market winners
Pro-market losers
Anti-market losers
N

For Yeltsin

For Ziuganov

(%)

(%)

N

71
50
23
4

1
25
20
52

206
8
252
210
676

concern for those who had suffered the most. In the last three months
before the June election, he took concrete and visible steps in this
direction_ He made efforts to reduce the huge backlog of overdue
wages, he announced the doubling of the minimum pension, and he
signed decrees compensating both those whose savings had been depleted by the 1992 hyperinflation and investors who suffered losses
from fraudulent investment schemes. 22
In the end, Yeltsin was able to win over some of the "losers" in the
transition who were also pro-market. The losers who were anti-market
belonged to Ziuganov, Zhirinovskii, and Lebed' in any case, and the
pro-market winners were solidly in Yeltsin's camp. But it was the middle groups that Yeltsin needed to attract, and as table 9 shows, he was
able to do so. Ziuganov won hardly any of the pro-market winners,
and Yeltsin struck out with the anti-market losers. But Yeltsin was able
to attract most of the winners, even if they were anti-market. And even
more important, he was able to attract almost a quarter of the largest
of the four groups-the pro-market losers-a larger share of this group
than Ziuganov was able to attract.
Logistic regression results (using odds multipliers)23 for Yeltsin and
Ziuganov supporters, displayed in table 10, again reveal that it was.not
22. Treisman, "Why Yeltsin Won," 67.
23. The coefficients in table lO are "odds multipliers," indicating the multiplicative change in the odds of having voted for Yeltsin or Ziuganov for a one-unit change
in a specific determinant, net of the influence of the other determinants in the regression equation. An odds multiplier of greater than one indicates that the odds of voting
for that candidate increase with increases in the value of a given independent variable
(determinant). An odds multiplier of less than one indicates that the odds of voting
for that candidate decrease with increases in the value of the independent variable.
For example, in table 10, in the Yeltsin column, a coefficient of 1.26 means that the
odds of voting for Yeltsin increased, on average, by 26 percent for each unit change
in the variable measuring satisfaction with standard of living, which was a seven-point
scale from completely dissatisfied (1) to completely satisfied (7). Compounded across
the seven-unit range of this variable, a 26 percent increase from unit to unit results
in a large difference between the most dissatisfied and the most satisfied people in
the predicted odds of intending to vote for Yeltsin. For further information on this
method, see Alfred Demaris, Logit Modeling: Practical Applications (Newbury Park, Calif.,
1992).
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Table 10
Determinants of Voting Preference for Yeltsin and Ziuganov
(odds multipliers from logistic regressions)
Yeltsin

Ziuganov

Age
Sex
Education
Winners/losers
Satisfaction with standard of living
Experienced injustice pre· perestroika
Experienced injustice post·perestroika
Index of support for equality
Index of support for functional inequality
Support for government minimums
Support for government limits on money
Support for government provided jobs
Support for free market
Support for socialism

1.01
1.29
1.03
.73***
1.26***
1.03
.92
.99
.85
.97
1.12
1.04
.64***
1.38***

1.03***
.99
1.09
1.22
.88
.71 **
1.16
.87
1.06
1.24
.96
.95
1.39***
.48***

Chi square (df)

310 (14)***

299 (14)***

**p

< .01 ***p < .001.

Note: All of the "support" variables (the last five in the table) were coded on a 5-point

scale with "1" indicating the highest support.

primarily ideology or demographics that divided Yeltsin and Ziuganov
voters, but rather one's personal experiences and general support for
the old or the new system_ What is most informative about this table
is the significance levels of these coefficients, which are marked by the
asterisks_ The independent variables that have the strongest effect on
voting intentions for Yeltsin and Ziuganov have asterisks (with more
asterisks indicating a greater level of statistical significance). Overall,
one should note the relative lack of significance of both the demographic variables (age, education, sex) and the "ideological variables,"
which consist of individual questions mentioned earlier in this paper
(for example, those in table 4) plus two indices of attitudes tapping
support for equality and for "functional inequality.,,24 Except for the
age variable for Ziuganov, most of these have little bearing on intent
to vote for these two candidates.
24. The "equality" index is the mean of the z scores of four questions (alpha =
.60): "How much influence should the size of the family the employee supports have
in determining the level of pay for an employee?"; "The fairest way of distributing
wealth and income would be to give everyone equal shares"; "The most important
thing is that people get what they need, even if this means allocating money from
those who have earned more than they need"; "It is just luck if some people are more
intelligent or skillful than others, so they don't deserve to earn more money." The
"functional inequality" index is the simple mean of two questions with a five-point
agree-disagree scale: "There is an incentive for individual effort only if differences in
income are large enough," and "It is all right if businessmen make good profits because
everyone benefits in the end."
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For both candidates, the most powerful determinants of voting are
the orientations toward the market and toward socialism, with the
expected results that the more pro-market people supported Yeltsin
and the more pro-socialist supported Ziuganov_ But from the results
both in this table and earlier, we know that support for these two
concepts is not so much rooted in ideology as in individual experience-especially economic experience_ For Yeltsin, the other determinants of support are economic-satisfaction with the standard of
living and the winners/losers question-and, to a lesser extent, support
for "functional inequality_" We saw this in table 8, where Yeltsin is
much more likely to draw the support from those who have done well
in the transition_
More surprisingly, perhaps, Ziuganov's support was also not particularly ideologicaL None of the ideological variables in the equation
were significant predictors of support for Ziuganov_ His support,
rather, was determined by people's orientation toward the past; his
supporters were more likely to be older, not to have experienced injustice in the communist era; supportive of socialism; and skeptical of
the market- But this support for the past, as we have seen, is bred more
of nostalgia than of ideology_ Most people, especially Ziuganov's supporters, remember the communist era as a time when they were better
off, and not particularly oppressed, apparently.
Yeltsin did, however, draw more votes than Ziuganov in both the
first and the runoff elections. It seems likely that this was due in part
to his success at locking in support from the reformers and the winners, while at the same time drawing some support, at least, from those
who were not doing so well but who nonetheless supported the marketIn the end, while some people may have remembered the past more
fondly than they actually experienced it, they did not want to turn
back the clocks. During the course of the spring 1996 campaign, Yeltsin
was able to boost his support by using the media effectively, capitalizing on popular support for both the market and state guarantees, and
mobilizing those supporters to vote. It helped that his multiple opponents divided the opposition vote.
The ideological similarities and differences among supporters of
the major presidential candidates are evident from table 11. This table
shows the percentage of supporters of each of these candidates who
agreed (strongly or somewhat) with some of the principles of equality,
statism, floors, and ceilings that have been discussed in this article.
These principles are arranged roughly by the amount of agreement
among the supporters of the various candidates, with general agreement among all supporters for the principles at the top of the table,
and less agreement for those at the bottom. As we have seen before,
there is almost universal support for some of the "high floors" questions, and this is true across all four groups of supporters. 25 Almost all
25_ These results reinforce a similar comparison of attitudes by supporters of
various political parties in the 1993 elections: while supporters of the communists
differed substantially from those favoring Russia's Choice on their attitudes toward a
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Table 11
Support for Equality and Statism
by Supporters of Presidential Candidates
(percentage of respondents "strongly agreeing" or "agreeing")

Government should provide
minimum standard of living.
Government should provide jobs.
Hard workers should earn more.
People are entitled to pass wealth to
children.
Give everyone equal shares of
wealth.
People are entitled to keep
earnings.
People should get what they need.
Government should place limits on
wealth.

Yeltsin

Zhirinovskii

Ziuganov

Lebed'

92.3
94.3
93.4
98.5

95.4
96.9
95.1
84.6

96.5
97.2
94.3
93.1

97.9
97.0
99.0
98.0

21.6

40.3

44.0

29.3

90.7

65.6

70.4

95.3

43.3
33.0

55.6
45.0

64.3
59.0

53.4
53.2

the supporters of all the candidates also favor some of the "high ceilings" propositions. The differences among the groups are more pronounced on the questions involving the redistribution of resources.
On these the Yeltsin supporters, in particular, have much less favorable
opinions than the supporters of the other candidates, and especially
of the Ziuganov supporters.
But overall, there is a remarkable level of agreement on some of
the key ideological issues: that the government should continue to
provide basic minimums, in terms of both jobs and a standard ofliving;
but that the society should abandon radical egalitarianism in favor of
a more meritocratic system where rewards and incentives matter. It is
this middle ground, we think, that Yeltsin appealed to and capitalized
on. His program was to continue the reforms toward a market economy, while at the same time attempting to protect the most vulnerable
members of society. In this, his campaign appeals matched the sentiments of most Russians. The people that opposed him did so largely
because of their own problems during the transition, and this caused
a nostalgic fondness for the past. But this nostalgia did not always
translate into votes. As liberal former Prime Minister Egor Gaidar commented: "Millions of people are prepared to conduct idle conversations about how great everything used to be and how terrible everymarket economy, supporters of all parties overwhelmingly favored state control of
large industries and state responsibility for jobs, health care, and housing. Matthew
Wyman, Bill Miller, Stephen White, and Paul Heywood, "Public Opinion, Parties and
Voters in the December 1993 Russian Elections," Europe·Asia Studies 47, no. 4 (1995):
591-614.
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thing is now. But left to himself, a person is not carried away by such
thoughts. And when left one-on-one with a ballot, a person was able
to ask himself: My friend, do you really want that badly to go back to
the past?,,26
The nostalgia was much more rooted in economics than in ideology
and reflected the widespread deterioration of the economy and of
living standards since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Given the lessthan-ideological orientation of most Russians, however, it seems unlikely that this hankering for the past will lead people to favor a restoration of the old system. Most Russians are suffering, but they see
hope in continued moderate reform and expect, however unrealistically, that their own situations will eventually improve_
This voting behavior is practical and interest-based in a way that
increasingly resembles "normal" voting behavior in western democracies. Some analysts of Russian voting behavior and public opinion have
suggested that votes and political participation in Russia have not been
strongly related to economic issues or cleavages. 27 If this were true
before, it no longer seems to be the case. In 1996 Russians voted for
Yeltsin (or for Ziuganov) for reasons closely tied to their own economic
experiences, interests, and attitudes. Both in this respect, and in their
preference for Yeltsin's appeal for continuity and stability, Russia is
becoming a more normal and stable society.
26. Interview with Gaidar in Novoe vremia, July 1996, no. 28:12-13; translated in
Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press 48, no. 29 (14 August 1996): 16-17.
27. For example, Timothy J. Colton, "Economics and Voting in Russia," Post-Soviet
Affairs 12, no. 4 (October-December 1996): 289-317; and Stephen White, Richard Rose,
and Ian McAllister, How Russia Votes (Chatham, Nj., 1997).

